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Abstract
Risk assessment is a systematic and iterative process, which involves risk analysis, where 
probable hazards are identified, and then corresponding risks are evaluated along with 
solutions to mitigate the effect of these risks. In this article, the outcome of a risk assess-
ment process will be detailed, where a large industrial robot is used as an intelligent 
and flexible lifting tool that can aid operators in assembly tasks. The realization of a 
collaborative assembly station has several benefits, such as increased productivity and 
improved ergonomic work environment. The article will detail the design of the layout 
of a collaborative assembly workstation, which takes into account the safety and produc-
tivity concerns of automotive assembly plants. The hazards associated with hand-guided 
collaborative operations will also be presented.
Keywords: hand-guided robots, industrial system safety, collaborative operations, 
human-robot collaboration, risk assessment, hazards
1. Introduction
In a manufacturing context, collaborative operations refer to specific applications where 
operators and robots share a common workspace [1, 2]. This allows operators and industrial 
robots to share assembly tasks within the pre-defined workspace—referred to as collaborative 
workspace—and this ability to work collaboratively is expected to improve productivity as 
well as the working environment of the operator [3].
As pointed out by Marvel et al. [1], collaborative operation implies that there is a higher prob-
ability for occurrence of hazardous situations due to close proximity of humans and industrial 
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robots. The hazardous situations can lead to serious injury and, therefore, safety needs to be 
guaranteed while developing collaborative applications [4].
ISO 10218-1 [5] and ISO 10218-2 [6] are international standards aimed at specifying require-
ments for safety on the design of industrial robots and robotic systems, respectively. They 
recognize collaborative applications and list four specific types of collaborative operations, 
namely (1) safety-rated monitored stop, (2) hand-guiding, (3) speed and separation monitor-
ing, and (4) power and force limiting that can be implemented either individually or as a 
combination of one or more types.
As industrial robots and robotic systems are designed and integrated into specific manufac-
turing applications, the safety standards state that a risk assessment needs to be conducted 
is to ensure safe and reliable operations. Risk assessment, as standardized in ISO 12100 [7], 
is a detailed and iterative process of (1) risk analysis followed by (2) risk evaluation. The 
safety standards also state that the effect of residual risks needs to be eliminated or mitigated 
through appropriate risk reduction measures. The goal of a risk assessment program is to 
ensure that operators, equipment as well as the environment are protected.
As pointed out by Clifton and Ericson [8], hazard identification is a critical step, where the 
aim is the cognitive process of hazard recognition, whereas the solutions to mitigate the risks 
are relatively straightforward. Etherton et al. noted that designers lack a database of known 
hazards during innovation and design stages [9]. The robot safety standards (ISO 10218-1 
[5] and ISO 10218-2 [6]) also have tabulated a list of significant hazards whose purpose is 
to inform risk assessors of probable inherent dangers associated with robot and robotic sys-
tems. Therefore, a case study [10] is used to investigate the characteristics of hazards and the 
associated risks that are relevant for collaborative operation. The study is focused on a collab-
orative assembly station, where large industrial robots and operators are to share a common 
workspace enabled through the application of a systematic and standardized risk assessment 
process followed by risk reduction measures.
This article is structured as follows: in Section 2, an overall description of the methodology 
used to conduct the research will be presented along with limitations; Section 3 will detail 
theoretical background; and Section 4 will present the results of the article followed by discus-
sion of the result and conclude with remarks on future work.
1.1. Background
Recently, there have been many technological advances within the areas of robot control 
which aims to solve perceived issues associated with robot safety [11]. A safe collaborative 
assembly cell, where operators and industrial robots collaborate to complete assembly tasks, 
is seen as an important technological solution for several reasons including (1) ability to adapt 
to market fluctuations and trends [12]. (2) Have the possibility to decrease takt time [13, 14]. 
(3) Improving working environment by decreasing the ergonomic load of the operator [15].
An automotive assembly plant is typically separated into three units: (1) the highly automated 
body-in-white unit where industrial robots are used to weld sheet metal parts that form the 
chassis; (2) the body painting unit and (3) the final assembly unit where various components 
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of an automotive are assembled sequentially. The final assembly plants within the automotive 
industry can be characterized as:
1. having a high production rate, where the capacity of the plant can vary significantly de-
pending on several factors, such as variant, plant location, etc.
2. being dependent on manual labor as the nature of assembly tasks require highly dexterous 
motion with good hand-eye coordination along with general decision-making skills.
Though, operators are often aided by powered tools to carry out assembly tasks such as 
pneumatic nut-runners as well as lifting tools, there is a need to improve the ergonomics of 
their work environment. As pointed by Ore et al. [15], there is demonstrable potential for 
collaborative operations to aid operators in various tasks including assembly and quality 
control.
Earlier attempts at introducing automation devices, such as cobots [13, 16], have resulted in 
custom machinery that functions as ergonomic support. Recently, industrial robots specifi-
cally designed for collaboration such as UR10 [17] and KUKA iiwa [18] are available that can 
be characterized as: (1) having the ability to detect collisions with any part of the robot struc-
ture; and (2) having the ability to carry smaller load and shorter reach compared to traditional 
industrial robots. This feature coupled with the ability to detect collisions fulfills the condition 
for power and force limiting.
Industrial robots that does not have power and force limiting feature, such as KUKA KR210 
[18] or the ABB IRB 6600 [19], have traditionally been used within fenced workstations. In 
order to enter a robot workspace, the operator was required to deliberately open a gate, which 
is monitored by a safety device that stops all robot and manufacturing operations within the 
workstation. As mentioned before, the purpose of the research project was to explore collab-
orative operations where traditional industry robots are employed for assembly tasks. These 
robots have the capacity to carry heavy loads with long reach that can be effective for various 
assembly tasks. However, these advantages correspond to an inherent source of hazard that 
needs to be understood and managed with appropriate safety focused solutions.
2. Working methodology
To take advantage of the physical performance characteristics of large industrial robots along with 
the advances in sensor and control technologies, a research project ToMM [20] comprising of mem-
bers representing the automotive industry, research, and academic institutions were tasked with 
understanding and specifying industry-relevant safety requirements for collaborative operations.
2.1. Industrial relevance
The requirements for safety that are relevant for the manufacturing industry are detailed in 
various standards such as ISO EN 12100 and ISO EN 10218 (parts 1 and 2) which are maintained 
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by various organizations such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO [21]) and 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC [22]). Though these organizations do not have 
the authority to enforce the standards, a legislatory body such as the European Union, through 
the EU Machinery directive mandates compliance with normative standards [23] which are 
prefixed with an EN before their reference number.
2.2. Problem study and data collection
Objective of the research was to understand the safety requirements for high-volume assem-
bly stations when industrial robots are to be used in a collaborative manner. A case-based 
approach [10] was followed, where the initial study was focused on an assembly station where 
a heavy engine component is assembled on an engine block. To gain a better understanding 
and knowledge of the case study, the following methods were employed:
1. Regular meeting in order to have detailed discussion with engineers and line managers at 
the assembly plant [24].
2. Visits to the plant allowed the researchers to directly observe the functioning of the station. 
This also enabled the researchers to have informal interviews with line workers regarding 
the assembly tasks as well as the working environment.
3. The researchers participated in the assembly process, guided by the operators, allowed the 
researchers to gain intuitive understanding of the nature of the task.
4. Literature sourced from academia, books as well as documentation from various industrial 
equipment manufactures were reviewed.
2.3. Integrating safety in early design phase
Introduction of a robot into a manual assembly cell might lead to unforeseen hazards whose 
potential to cause harm needs to be eliminated or minimized. The machinery safety stan-
dard [7] suggests the practice of conducting risk assessment followed by risk reduction mea-
sures to ensure the safety of the operator as well as other manufacturing processes. The 
risk assessment process is iterative that concludes when all probable hazards have been 
identified along with solutions to mitigate the effects of these hazards have been imple-
mented. This process is usually carried out through a safety program and can be docu-
mented according to [25].
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the safety-focused design strategy employed during the 
research and development phase. The case study was analyzed to understand the benefits of 
collaborative operations done through a conceptual study, where the overall robot, operator, 
and collaborative tasks were specified. Employing the results of the conceptual study, the risk 
assessment methodology followed by risk reduction was carried out where each phase was 
supported by the use of demonstrators. Björnsson [26] and Jonsson [27] have elaborated the 
principles of demonstrator-based design along with their perceived benefits and this method-
ology has been employed in this research work within the context of safety for collaborative 
operations.
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3. Theoretical background
In this section, beginning with an overview of industrial robots, concepts from hazard theory, 
industrial system safety and reliability, and task-based risk assessment methodology will be 
detailed.
3.1. Industrial robotic system and collaborative operations
An industrial robot is defined as an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipur-
pose manipulator, programmable in three or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or 
mobile for use in industrial automation applications [28]. Figure 2(A) shows an illustration 
of an articulated six-axis manipulator along with the control cabinet and a teach pendant. 
The control cabinet houses various control equipment such as motor controller, input/output 
modules, network interfaces, etc.
The teach pendant is used to program the robot, where each line of code establish the robot 
pose—in terms of coordinates in x, y, z and angles A, B, C—which when executed allow 
the robot to complete a task. This method of programming is referred to as position control, 
where individual robot poses are explicitly hard coded. In contrast to position control, sensor-
based control allows motion control to be regulated by sensor values. Examples of sensors 
include vision, force and torque, etc.
On a manufacturing line, robots can be programmed to move at high speed undertaking repet-
itive tasks. This mode of operation is referred to as automatic mode, and allows the robot con-
troller to execute the program in a loop, provided all safety functions are active. Additionally, 
ISO 10218-1 [5] has defined manual reduced-speed to allows safe programming and testing of 
the intended function of the robotic system, where the speed is limited to 250 mm/s at the tool 
center point. The manual high-speed allows the robot to be moved at high speed, provided all 
safety functions are activate and this mode is used for verification of the intended function.
The workspace within the robotic station where robots run in automatic mode is termed Robot 
Workspace (see Figure 2(B)). In collaborative operations, where operators and robots can 
share a workspace, a clearly defined Collaborative Workspace is suggested by [29]. Though 
the robot can be moved in automatic mode within the collaborative workspace, the speed of 
the robot is limited [29] and is determined during risk assessment.
Figure 1. Overview of the demonstrator-based design methodology employed to ensure a safe collaborative workstation.
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Robot safety standards recognize the implementation of one or more of the following four 
different modes of collaborative operation:
1. Safety-rated monitored stop stipulates that the robot ceases its motion with a category stop 
2 when the operator enters the collaborative workspace. In a category stop 2, the robot can 
decelerate to a stop in a controlled manner.
2. Hand-guiding allows the operator to send position commands to the robot with the help 
of a hand-guiding tool attached at or close to the end-effector.
3. Speed and separation monitoring allows the operator and the robot to move concurrently 
in the same workspace provided that there is a safe separation distance between them 
which is greater than the prescribed protective separation distance determined during risk 
assessment.
4. Power and force limiting operation refers to robots that are designed to be intrinsically safe 
and allows contact with the operator provided it does not exert force (either quasi-static or 
transient contact) larger than a prescribed threshold limit.
3.2. Robotic system safety and reliability
An industrial robot normally functions as part of an integrated manufacturing system (IMS) 
where multiple subsystems that perform different functions operate cohesively. As noted 
by Levenson (page 14 [30]), safety is a system property (not a component property) and 
needs to be controlled at the system level. This implies that safety as a property needs 
to be considered at early design phases, which Ericson (page 34 [8]) refers to as CD-HAT 
or Conceptual Design Hazard Analysis Type. CD-HAT is the first seven types of hazard 
analysis types, which needs to be considered during various design phases in order to avoid 
costly design rework.
Figure 2. (A) An example of a manipulator along with the control box and the teach pendant. Examples include KUKA 
KR-210 [18] and ABB IR 6620 [19]. (B) Illustrates the interaction between the three participants of a collaborative assembly 
cell within their corresponding workspaces [3].
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To realize a functional IMS, a coordinated effort in the form of a system safety program (SSP 
[8]) which involve participants with various levels of involvement (such as operators, main-
tenance, line managers, etc.) are carried out. Risk assessment and risk reduction processes are 
conducted in conjecture with the development of an IMS, in order to promote safety, during 
development, commissioning, maintenance, upgradation, and finally decommissioning.
3.2.1. Functional safety and sensitive protective equipment (SPE)
Functional safety refers to the use of sensors to monitor for hazardous situations and take eva-
sive actions upon detection of an imminent hazard. These sensors are referred to as sensitive 
protective equipment (SPE) and the selection, positioning, configuration, and commissioning 
of equipment have been standardized and detailed in IEC 62046 [31]. IEC 62046 defines the 
performance requirements for this equipment and as stated by Marvel and Norcross [32], 
when triggered, these sensors use electrical safety signals to trigger safety function of the 
system. They include provisions for two specific types: (1) electro-sensitive protective equip-
ment (ESPE) and (2) pressure-sensitive protective equipment (PSPE). These are to be used for 
the detection of the presence of human beings and can be used as part of the safety-related 
system [31].
Electro-sensitive protective equipment (ESPE) uses optical, microwaves, and passive infrared 
techniques to detect operators entering a hazard zone. That is, unlike physical fence, where 
the operators and the machinery are physically separated, ESPE relies on the operators to 
enter a specific zone for the sensor to be triggered. Examples include laser curtains [33], laser 
scanners [34], and vision-based safety systems such as the SafetyEye [35].
Pressure-sensitive protective equipment (PSPE) has been standardized in parts 1–3 of ISO13856, 
and works on the principle of an operator physically engaging a specific part of the workstation. 
These include: (1) ISO 13856-1—pressure sensitive mats and floors [36]; (2) ISO 13856-2—pres-
sure sensitive bars, edges [37]. (3) ISO 13856-3—bumpers, plates, wires, and similar devices [38].
3.2.2. System reliability
Successful robotic systems are both safe to use and reliable in operation. In an integrated 
manufacturing system (IMS), reliability is the probability that a component of the IMS will 
perform its intended function under pre-specified conditions [39]. One measure of reliability 
is MTTF (mean time to failure) and ranges of this measure has been standardized into five 
discrete level levels or performance levels (PL) ranging from a to e. For example, PL = d refers 
to a 10–6 > MTTF ≥ 10–7, which is the required performance level with a category structure 3 
ISO 10218-2 (page 10, Section 5.2.2 [6]). That is, in order to be viable to the industry, the final 
design of the robotic system should reach or exceed the minimum required performance level.
3.3. Hazard theory: hazards, risks, and accidents
Ericson [8] states that a mishap or an accident is an event which occurs when a hazard, or 
more specifically hazardous element, is actuated upon by an initiating mechanism. That is, a 
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hazard is a pre-requisite for an accident to occur and is defined as a potential source of harm 
[7] and is composed of three basic components: (1) hazardous element (HE), (2) initiating 
mechanism (IM), and (3) target/threat (T/T).
A hazardous element is a resource that has the potential to create a hazard. A target/threat is 
the person or the equipment directly affected when the hazardous element is activated by an 
initiating mechanism. These three components, when combined together, can be referred to 
as a hazard (see Figure 3(A)) and are essential components for it to exist. Based on these defi-
nitions, if any of the three components are removed or eliminated, by any means (see Section 
3.4.2), it is possible to eliminate or reduce the effect of the hazard.
To better illustrate these concepts, consider the fatal accident that took place on July 21, 1984, 
where an experienced operator entered a robotic workstation while the robot was in auto-
matic mode (see Figure 3(B)). The robot was programmed to grasp a die-cast part, dip the part 
in a quenching tank and place it on an automatic trimming machine. According to Lee et al. 
[40], the operator was found pinned between the robot and a safety-pole by another opera-
tor of an adjacent die-cast station who became curious after hearing the hissing noise of the 
air-hose for 10–15 min. The function of the safety pole was to limit robot motion and together 
with the robot-arm can be considered to be a hazardous element. The hazard was initiated 
by the operator who intentionally entered the workstation either by jumping over the rails or 
through a 19-inch unguarded spacing and caused the accident. The operator was the target of 
this unfortunate accident and was pronounced dead after 5 days of the accident.
A hazard is designed into a system [8, 30] and for accident to occur depends on two factors: (1) 
unique set of hazard components and (2) accident risk presented by the hazard components, 
where risk is defined
  Risk = Probability x Severity (1)
Figure 3. (A) The hazard triangle where the three components of hazards—hazardous element, initiating mechanism, 
and target/threat—are essential and required for the hazard to exist (adapted from page 17 [8]). (B) Shows the layout of 
the robotic workstation where a fatal accident took place on July 21, 1984 [40].
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Ericson notes that a good hazard description can support the risk assessment team to better 
understand the problem and therefore can enable them to make better judgments (e.g., under-
standing the severity of the hazard), and therefore suggest that the a good hazard description 
needs to contain the three hazard components.
3.4. Task-based risk assessment and risk reduction
Risk assessment is a general methodology where the scope is to analyze and evaluate risks 
associated with complex system. Various industries have specific methodologies with the 
same objective. Etherton has summarized a critical review of various risk assessment meth-
odologies for machine safety in [41]. According to ISO 12100, risk assessment (referred to 
as MSRA—machine safety risk assessment [41]) is an iterative process which involves two 
sequential steps: (1) risk analysis and (2) risk evaluation. ISO 12100 suggests that if risks are 
deemed serious, measures should be taken to either eliminate or mitigate the effects of the 
risks through risk reduction as depicted in Figure (4).
3.4.1. Risk analysis and risk evaluation
Within the context of machine safety, risk analysis begins with identifying the limits of 
machinery, where the limits in terms of space, use, time are identified and specified. Within 
this boundary, activities focused on identifying hazards are undertaken. The preferred con-
text for identifying hazards for robotics systems is task-based, where he tasks that needs 
to be undertaken during various phases of operations are first specified. Then the risk 
assessors specify the hazards associated with each tasks. Hazard identification is a critical 
step and ISO 10218-1 [5] and ISO 10218-2 [6] tabulates significant hazards associated with 
robotic systems. However, they do not explicitly state the hazards associated with collab-
orative operations.
Risk evaluation is based on a systematic metrics where severity of injury, exposure to 
hazard and avoidance of hazard are used to evaluate the hazard (see page 9, RIA TR 
R15.306-2014 [25]). The evaluation results in specifying the risk level in terms of neg-
ligible, low, medium-high, and very-high, and determine risk reduction measures to 
be employed. To support the activities associated with risk assessment, ISO TR 15066 
[29] details information required to conduct risk assessment specifically for collaborative 
applications.
3.4.2. Risk reduction
When risks are deemed serious, the methodology demands measures to eliminate and/or 
mitigate the risks. The designers have a hierarchical methodology that can be employed to 
varying degree depending on the risks that have to be managed. The three hierarchical meth-
ods allow the designers to optimize the design and can choose either one or a combination of 
the methods to sufficiently eliminate/mitigate the risks. They are: (1) inherently safe design 
measures; (2) safeguarding and/or complementary protective measures; and (3) information 
for use.
Risk Assessment for Collaborative Operation: A Case Study on Hand-Guided Industrial Robots
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70607
175
4. Result: demonstrator for a safe hand-guided collaborative operation
In this section, the development and functioning of a safe assembly station will be detailed, 
where a large industrial robot is used in a hand-guided collaborative operation. In order to 
understand potential benefits with hand-guided industrial robots, an automotive assembly 
station will be presented as a case study in Section 4.1. With the aim to improve the ergonom-
ics of the assembly station and increase the productivity, the assembly tasks are conceptual-
ized as robot, operator, and collaborative task where the collaborative task is the hand-guided 
operation and is described in Section 4.2. The results of the iterative risk assessment and risk 
reduction process (see Section 3.4) will be detailed in Section 4.3. The final layout and the task 
sequence will be detailed in Section 4.4, and Table 1 will document the hazards that were iden-
tified during risk assessment that were used to improve the safety features of the assembly cell.
4.1. Case study: manual assembly of a flywheel housing cover
The assembly task is to install a flywheel housing cover (FWC) on the engine block with an inter-
mediate step between the picking of the FWC from the material rack and securing it on the engine 
block with fasteners. The assembly of FWC, which weighs 20 kg, is a manual operation and these 
tasks are carried out by one or more operators (see Figure 5(A)) and can be described as follows:
1. An operator picks up the flywheel housing cover (FWC) with the aid of a lifting device from 
position P1. The covers are placed on a material rack and can contain upto three part variants.
2. This operator moves from position P1 to P2 by pushing the FWC and installs it on the ma-
chine (integrated machinery) where secondary operations will be performed.
3. After the secondary operation, the operator pushes the FWC to the engine housing (posi-
tion P3). Here, the operator needs to align the flywheel housing cover with the engine 
block with the aid of guiding pins. After the two parts are aligned, the operator pushes the 
flywheel housing cover forward until the two parts are in contact. The operator must exert 
force to mate these two surfaces.
4. Then the operators begin to fasten the parts with several bolts with the help of two pneu-
matically powered devices. In order to keep low takt time, these tasks are done in parallel 
and require the participation of more than one operator.
Figure 4. An overview of the task-based risk assessment methodology.
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4.2. Task allocation and conceptual design of the hand-guiding tool
Figure 5(B) and (C), shows ergonomic simulations reported by Ore et al. [15] and shows the 
operator being aided by an industrial robot to complete the task. The first two tasks can be 
No.Hazard description Hazardous 
element (HE)
Initiating 
mechanism (IM)
Target/threat 
(T/T)
Risk reduction measure
1. The operator can accidentally 
enter robot workspace and 
collide with the robot moving 
at high speed
Fast moving 
robot
Operator is 
unaware of the 
system state
Operators 1. A light curtain to monitor 
the robot workspace. 2. A 
lamp to signal the system 
state
2. In collaborative mode, 
sensor-guided motion is 
active. Robot motion can be 
triggered unintentionally 
resulting in unpredictable 
motion
Crushing Operator 
accidentally 
activate the 
sensor,
Operator(s) 
and/or 
equipment(s)
An enabling device, 
when actuated, will start 
sensor-guided motion. An 
ergonomically designed 
enabling device can act as a 
hand-guiding tool
3. The operator places their 
hands between the FWC and 
the engine, thereby crushing 
their hands
Crushing Operator 
distracted due to 
assembly task
Operator An enabling device can 
ensure that the operator’s 
hands are at a predefined 
location.
4. While aligning the pins with 
the holes, the operator can 
break the pins by moving 
vertically or horizontally
Imprecise 
hand-
guided 
motion
Operator fails 
to keep steady 
motion
Operators 1. Vertical hand-guided 
motion needs to be 
eliminated. 2. Operator 
training
5. The robot collides with an 
operator while being hand-
guided by another operator
Collision Designated 
operator is not 
aware of others 
in the vicinity
Operators The designated operator has 
clear view of the station
6. An operator accidentally 
engages mode-change button 
though the collaborative task 
is incomplete
Error in 
judgment 
of the 
operators
Engaging the 
mode-change 
button
Operator/
equipment
A button on the hand-guiding 
tool that the operator engages 
before exiting the workspace
Table 1. The table describes the hazards that were identified during the risk assessment process.
Figure 5. (A) Shows the manual workstation where several operators work together to assemble flywheel housing covers 
(FWC) on the engine block. (B) Shows the robot placing the FWC on the integrated machinery. (C) Shows the robot 
being hand-guided by an operator thereby reducing the ergonomic effort to position the flywheel housing cover on the 
engine block.
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automated by the robot, i.e., picking the FWC from Position 1 and moving it to the integrated 
machine (position P2, Figure 5(B)). Then, the robot moves the FWC to the hand over position 
where the robot will come to a stop and signal to the operator that the collaborative mode is 
activated. This allows the operator to hand-guide the robot by grasping the FWC and direct-
ing the motion towards the engine block.
Once the motion of the robot is under human control, the operator can assemble the FWC 
onto the engine block and proceeds to secure it with bolts. After the bolts have been fastened, 
the operator then moves the robot back to the hand-over position and reactivates the auto-
matic mode which starts the next cycle.
4.3. Safe hand-guiding in the collaborative workspace
The risk assessment identified several hazardous situations that can affect the safe function-
ing during the collaborative mode—that is when the operator goes into the workstation and 
hand-guides the robot to assemble the FWC—and has been tabulated in Table 1.
Figure 6(A) and (B) shows two versions of the end-effector that was developed to support 
hand-guided robotic assembly. The safety focused design of the hand-guiding tool shown 
in Figure 6(A) has been detailed by Gopinath et al. [42] where the interfaces are part of the 
end-effector. That is, in an open enclosure (without physical fences—not shown), the location 
for the interfaces and control devices would optimally be a design feature of the end-effector. 
However, risk assessment pointed out that an open enclosure might require the following 
safety measures:
1. The robot needs to be programmed to move at slow speed so that it can stop (in time) ac-
cording to speed and separation monitoring mode of collaborative operation.
2. To implement speed and separation monitoring, a safety rated vision system might be 
probable solution. However, this may not be viable solution on the current factory floor.
Figure 6. (A) and (B) are two versions of the end-effector that was prototyped to verify and validate the design.
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The limited space, high volume and the nature of the hazards puts severe restriction on the 
type of safety solution that can be considered. An enclosed station is shown in Figure 7, where 
physical fences are being used as a safeguarding measure to limit personnel movement, 
thereby eliminating the possibility of operator accidently entering the robot workspace. The 
layout of this collaborative station has been detailed by Gopinath et al. [43] and in Table 2, a 
comparison of the design features has been discussed. The change from Design A to Design B 
was motivated by change in requirements namely:
1. A change in design that would allow the operator to visually align the pins on the engine 
block with the mating holes on the FWC.
2. A change in design to improve reliability as well as avoid tampering through the use of 
standardized components. Ensure that the operator feel safer during hand-guiding by en-
suring that the robot arms are not close to the operator.
4.4. Demonstrator for a safe hand-guided collaborative assembly workstation
Figure 7 shows a picture of the demonstrator developed in a laboratory environment. Here, a 
KUKA KR-210 industrial robot is part of the robotic system where the safeguarding solutions 
include the use of physical fences as well as sensor-based solutions.
Figure 8 describes the sequence of task necessary to complete the assembly operations. These 
tasks have been separated into three, i.e., robot, operator, and collaborative tasks and can be 
described as follows:
1. The robot tasks, which are preprogramed tasks undertaken in automatic mode. When the 
robot tasks are completed, it is programmed to stop at the hand-over position.
2. The collaborative task which begins when the operators enters the monitored space and 
takes control of the robot using the hand-guiding device. The collaborative mode is com-
plete when the operator returns the robot to the hand-over position and restarts the auto-
matic mode.
3. The operator task is the fastening of the bolts required to secure the FWC to the engine 
block. The operators need to fasten several bolts and therefore use pneumatically powered 
tool (not shown here) to help them with this task.
4.4.1. Safeguarding
With an understanding that operators are any personnel within the vicinity of hazardous machin-
ery [7], the physical fences can be used to ensure that they do not accidentally enter a hazardous 
zone. The design requirements stated that the engine block needs to be outside the enclosed zone, 
meant that the robot needs to move out of the fenced area during collaborative mode (see Figure 8). 
Therefore, the hand over position is located inside the enclosure and the assembly point is located 
outside of the enclosure and both these points are part of the collaborative workspace. The opening 
in the fences is monitored during automatic mode using laser curtains.
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Design feature Design A Design B Design evaluation
1. Orientation of the 
end-effector
End-effector is 
parallel to the robot 
wrist
End-effector is 
perpendicular to the 
robot wrist.
In design A, the last two links of the robot 
are close to the operator which might make 
the operators feel unsafe. Design B might 
allow for an overall safer design due to use of 
standardized components
2. Position of 
Flywheel housing 
cover (FWC)
The FWC is 
positioned left to the 
operator
The FWC is positioned 
in front of the operator
Design A requires more effort from the 
operator to align the locating pins (on the 
engine block) and the mating holes (on the 
FWC). The operator loses sight of the pins 
when the two parts are close to each other. In 
Design B, it is possible to align the two parts 
by visually aligning the outer edges
3. Location of 
Emergency stop
Good location and 
easy to actuate
Good location and 
easy to actuate
In design A, it was evaluated that the E-stop 
can be accidentally actuated which might lead 
to unproductive stops
4. Location of visual 
interfaces
Good location and 
visibility
No visual interfaces Evaluation of design A resulted in the decision 
that interfaces need to be visible to all working 
within the vicinity
5. Location of 
physical interfaces
Good location with 
easy reach.
Minimal physical 
interfaces
Evaluation of design A resulted in the decision 
that interfaces are optimally placed outside 
the fences area
6. Overall 
ergonomic design
The handles are 
angled and is more 
comfortable
The distance between 
the handles is short
Designs A and B have good overall design. 
Design B uses standardized components. 
Design A employs softer materials and 
interfaces that are easily visible
Table 2. Feature comparison of two versions of the end-effector shown in Figure 6(A) and (B).
Figure 7. The layout of the physical demonstrator installed in a laboratory environment.
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4.4.2. Interfaces
During risk evaluation, the decision to have several interfaces was motivated. A single 
warning LED lamp (see Figure 8) can convey that when the robot has finished the prepro-
grammed task and waiting to be hand-guided. Additionally, the two physical buttons out-
side the enclosure has separate functions. The Auto-continue button allows the operator to 
let the robot continue in automatic mode if the laser curtains were accidentally triggered by 
an operator and this button is located where it is not easily reached. The second button is 
meant to start the next assembly cycle (see Table 1). Table 1 (Nos. 2 and 3) motivates the use 
of enabling devices to trigger the sensor guided motion (see Figure 6(B)). The two enabling 
devices provide the following functions: (1) it acts as a hand-guiding tool that the operator 
can use to precisely maneuver the robot. (2) By specifying that the switches on the enabling 
device are engaged for hand-guiding motion, the operators hands are at a prespecified and 
safe location. (3) Additionally, by engaging the switch, the operator is deliberately changing 
the mode of the robot to collaborative-mode. This ensures that unintended motion of the 
robot is avoided.
Figure 8. The figure describes the task sequence of the collaborative assembly station where an industrial robot is used 
as an intelligent and flexible lifting tool. The tasks are decomposed into three — Operator task (OT), Collaborative task 
(CT) and Robot task (RT) — which are detailed in Table 3.
Tasks Task description
1. Robot task The robot tasks are to pick up the flywheel housing cover, place the part on the fixture and 
when the secondary operators are completed, pick up the part and wait at the hand-over 
position. During this mode, the warning lamp is red, signaling automatic mode. The hand-
over position is located inside the enclosed area and is monitored by laser curtains. The robot 
will stop if an operator accidentally enters this workspace and can be restarted by the auto-
continue button (Figure 7)
2. Operator task Enter collaborative space: When the warning lamp turns to green, the laser curtains are 
deactivated; the operator enters the collaborative workspace
3. Collaborative 
task
Engage enabling switch: the operator begins hand-guiding by engaging both the enabling 
switches simultaneously. This activates the sensor-guided motion and the operator can move 
the robot by applying force on the enabling device. If the operator releases the enabling switch, 
the motion is deactivated (see point 2 in Table 1). To reactivate motion, the operator engages 
both the enabling switches
4. Collaborative 
task
Hand-guide the robot: the operator moves the FWC from the hand-over position to the 
assembly point. Then removes the clamp and return the robot back to the hand-over position
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5. Discussion
In this section, the discussion will be focused on the application of the risk assessment meth-
odology and the hazards that were identified during this process.
5.1. Task-based risk assessment methodology
A risk assessment (RA) is done on a system that exists in a form that can function as a context 
within which hazards can be documented. In the case study, a force/torque sensor was used to 
hand-guide the robot and this technique was chosen at the conceptual stage. RA based on this 
technique led to decision of introducing enabling devices (No. 2 in Table 1) to ensure that, while 
the operator is hand guiding the robot, the hands are within a predetermined safe location and 
is engaged. Another industrially viable solution is the use of joysticks to hand-guide the robot 
but this option was not explored further during discussion as it might be less intuitive than 
force/torque based control. Regardless, it is implicit that the choice of technique poses its own 
hazardous situation and the risk assessors need a good understanding of the system boundary.
Additionally, during risk assessment, the failure of the various components was not consid-
ered explicitly. For example, what if laser curtains failed to function as intended? The expla-
nation lies in the choice of components. As stated in Section 3.2.2, a robotic system to be 
considered reliable, the components must have a performance level PL = d, which implies 
a very low probability of failure. Most safety-equipment manufactures publish their MTTF 
values along with their performance levels and the intended use.
5.2. Hazards
The critical step in conducting risk assessment (RA) is hazard identification. In Section 3.3, a 
hazard was decomposed into three: (1) hazardous element (HE), (2) initiating mechanism (IM), 
and (3) target/threat (T/T). The three sides of the hazard triangle (Section 3.3) have lengths 
proportional to the degree with which these components can trigger the hazard and cause 
an accident. That is, if the length of IM side is much larger than the other two, then the most 
influencing factor to cause an accident is IM. The discussion on risk assessment (Section 3.4) 
stresses on eliminating/mitigating hazards which implies that the goal of risk assessment can 
Tasks Task description
5. Collaborative 
task
Engage automatic mode: before going out of the assembly station, the operator needs to 
engage the three-button switch. This deliberate action signals to the robot that the collaborative 
task is complete
6. Robot task The operator goes out and engages the mode-change button. Then, the following sequence of 
events is carried out: (1) laser curtains are activated, (2) warning lamp turns from green to red, 
and (3) the robot starts the next cycle
Table 3. The table articulates the sequence of tasks that were formulated during the risk assessment process.
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be understood as a method to reduce/remove one or more of the sides of the hazard triangle. 
Therefore, documenting the hazards in terms of its components might allow for simplified 
and straightforward downstream RA activities.
The hazards presented in Table 1 can be summarized as follows: (1) the main source of hazardous 
element (HE) is slow/fast motion of the robot. (2) The initiating mechanism (IM) can be attributed 
to unintended actions by an operator. (3) The safety of the operator can be compromised and has 
the possibility to damage machinery and disrupt production. It can also be motivated, based on 
the presented case study, that through the use of systematic risk assessment process, hazards 
associated with collaborative motion can be identified and managed to an acceptable level of risk.
As noted by Eberts and Salvendy [44] and Parsons [45], human factors play a major role in 
robotic system safety. There are various parameters that can be used to better understand the 
effect of human behavior in system such as overloaded and/or underloaded working environ-
ment, perception of safety, etc. The risk assessors need to be aware of human tendencies and 
take into consideration while proposing safety solutions. Incidentally, in the fatal accident 
discussed in Section 3.3, perhaps the operator did not perceive the robot as a serious threat 
and referred to the robot as Robby [40].
In an automotive assembly plant, as the production volume is relatively high and requires collabo-
rating with other operators, there is a higher probability for an operator to make errors. In Table 1 
(No. 6), a three-button switch was specified to ensure unintentional mode change of the robot. It is 
probable that an operator can accidentally engage the mode-change button (see Figure 7) while the 
robot is in collaborative mode or the hand-guiding operator did not intend the collaborative mode 
to be completed. In such a scenario, a robot operating in automatic mode was evaluated to have a 
high risk level, and therefore the decision was made to have a design change with an additional 
safety-interface—the three-button switch—that is accessible only to the hand-guiding operator.
Informal interviews suggested that the system should be inherently safe for the operators 
and that the task sequence—robot, operator, and collaborative tasks—should not demand 
constant monitoring by the operators as it might lead to increased stress. That is, operators 
should feel safe and in control and that the tasks should demand minimum attention and time.
6. Conclusion and future work
The article presents the results of a risk assessment program, where the objective was the 
development of an assembly workstation that involves the use of a large industrial robot in 
a hand-guiding collaborative operation. The collaborative workstation has been realized as 
a laboratory demonstrator, where the robot functions as an intelligent lifting device. That is, 
the tasks that can be automated have been tasked to the robot and these sequences of tasks 
are preprogrammed and run in automatic mode. During collaborative mode, operators are 
responsible for tasks that are cognitively demanding that require the skills and flexibility 
inherent to a human being. During this mode, the hand-guided robot carries the weight of the 
flywheel housing cover, thereby improving the ergonomics of the workstation.
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In addition to the laboratory demonstrator, an analysis of the hazards pertinent to hand-
guided collaborative operations has been presented. These hazards were identified during 
the risk assessment phase, where the hazardous element mainly stems from human error. The 
decisions taken during the risk reduction phase to eliminate or mitigate the risks associated 
with these hazards have also been presented.
The risk assessment was carried out through different phases, where physical demonstrators 
supported each phase of the process. The demonstrator-based approach allowed the research-
ers to have a common understanding of the nature of the system and the associated hazards. 
That is, it acted as platform for discussion. The laboratory workstation can act as a demon-
stration platform where operators and engineers can judge for themselves the advantage and 
disadvantages of collaborative operations. The demonstration activities can be beneficial to 
researchers as it can function as a feedback mechanism with respect to the decisions that have 
been made during the risk assessment process.
Therefore, the next step is to invite operators and engineers in trying out the hand-guided 
assembly workstation. The working hypothesis in inviting operators and engineers is that, 
personnel whose main responsibility during their working time in an assembly plant is to 
find the optimal balance between various production related parameters (such as mainte-
nance time, productivity, safety, working environment, etc.) might have deeper insight into 
the challenges of introducing large industrial robots in the assembly line.
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